We report the first Quantum key distribution (QKD) experiment over a 72 dB channel loss using superconducting nanowire single-photon detectors (SSPD, SNSPD) with the dark count rate (DCR) of 0.01 cps. The DCR of the SSPD, which is dominated by the blackbody radiation at room temperature, is blocked by introducing cold optical bandpass filter. We employ the differential phase shift QKD (DPS-QKD) scheme with a 1 GHz system clock rate. The quantum bit error rate (QBER) below 3 % is achieved when the length of the dispersion shifted fiber (DSF) is 336 km (72 dB loss), which is low enough to generate secure keys.
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The probability of a click event occurring at Bob's site is calculated as follows [19] ,
where Psignal and Pdark are the probability of a click event caused by a signal and by the dark count, respectively,  is the average photon number, Loss is the channel loss, Losssystem is the loss of the MZI-PCL, and tw is the time window. The sifted key generation rate and QBER are given by,
where  is the system clock frequency, td is the dead time of the TIA, and es is the baseline error rate.
Finally, the secure key generation rate after error correction and privacy amplification against general individual attack is given by,
where h QBER QBER • log QBER 1-QBER • log 1-QBER is the binary Shannon entropy and f(QBER) depends on the error correction algorithm. For the fittings, we take f(QBER) = 1.2, td = 20 ns, es = 0.01, = 1 GHz, tw = 100 ps, Losssystem = 2 dB,  = 6.7 and 4.0 % for DCR = 0.04 cps,  = 4.4 and 3.1 % for DCR = 0.01 cps, and a 50 % reduction in  due to the 100 ps time windows. The DPS-QKD system has been used in a field test in the Tokyo QKD network for a 90 km (27 dB loss) fiber transmission [11] . We measure the sifted key rate and QBER using the system, and secure key rate was calculated from Eq. (4). The extinction ratio and loss of the MZI-PLC were 20 dB and 2 dB, respectively. The extinction ratio limited the QBER of the system to 1 %. The timing of the pulse arrival between Alice and Bob is synchronized by another DSF of the same length as the quantum transmission line to compensate for the timing delay that results from using a long fiber (not shown in Fig. 2 ). To cope with the fluctuation in the pulse timing caused by the fiber length fluctuation during the QKD experiment, the temperature of the system was stabilized by blocking off an air conditioning of the room. The length of the sifted key was about 250 bits for a 306 km DSF and about 50 bits for a 336 km DSF. We averaged the results 3 times for the 306 km DSF and 6 times for the 336 km DSF.
The experimental results for QKD with SSPDs with a DCR of 0.04 cps are summarized in Fig. 3 (a) and in Table 1 . The open and closed circles show experimental results for the sifted key generation rate obtained using an optical attenuator and DSF, respectively. The experimental QBER results are also shown by triangles. The square symbols are calculated results for the secure key generation rate obtained using the experimental results for the sifted key rate and QBER based on the theory [19] . The curves are the results of theoretical fitting. As the channel loss increases, the sifted key rate decreases exponentially. The QBER is about 1 % when the channel loss is below 60 dB, indicating that the QBER is determined by the extinction ratio of the MZI-PLC. At a channel loss of 52.7 dB without including PLC-MZI loss, the sifted key generation rate is 31.95 bit/s and the QBER is 1.02 %, resulting in a secure key rate of 12.5 bit/s. The secure key rate is about six times higher than that for the previous longest experimental result obtained with a 260 km (52.9 dB loss) standard telecom fiber [4] . As the channel loss increases to 66 dB (306 km DSF), the sifted key rate and the QBER become 0.98 bit/s and 2.64 %, respectively. The QBER is low enough to generate a secure key with a rate of 0.17 bit/s. Although the theoretical curve indicates that it is possible to generate a secure key even at a channel loss of 72 dB (336 km DSF), we cannot generate a secure key at that length because the QBER exceeds 4.1 %. We attribute this to experimental imperfections such as a slight increase in the DCR caused by stray light and the relatively large jitter of the electronics. Figure 3(b) summarizes the results of a QKD experiment with DCR = 0.01 cps, when the bias current of the SSPDs is reduced. In this case, the QBER is low as the channel loss is less than around 70 dB. At a channel loss of 72 dB, the sifted key rate and QBER are 0.22 bit/s and 2.93 %, respectively, resulting in a secure key rate of 0.03 bit/s. To approach the asymptotic limit of 10 6 bits sifted key length, it takes about 2 month, which may be possible by upgrading the system with long-time fluctuation compensation circuit. As the channel loss increases to 77.9 dB, the QBER increases to 10.9 %, so, it is impossible to generate secure keys.
There have already been several QKD experiments undertaken in a field environment [8, 10, 11] . However, they were all performed in metropolitan areas and the distances were limited to about 100 km. The present results demonstrate the possible application of QKD between two metropolises such as New York and Washington D.C. (328 km) or London and Brussels (320 km), where there is more demand for QKD. If we use ultralow loss fiber (0.164 dB/km) instead of DSF [5] , we can further extend the distance to 439 km, which is longer than the direct distances between London and Paris (345 km), Tokyo and Osaka (397 km), or Paris and Geneva (411 km). Although the secure key rate of the present experiment is too small to generate secure keys for a real system, there are several ways to improve the key rate, such as by adopting a 10 GHz clock rate [6] , using a high  (>50 %) SSPD device [23] [24] [25] , and expanding the approach to wavelength-division multiplexing QKD [11] . With these new technologies, it may be possible to achieve QKD over 400 km at around kbit/s.
In conclusion, we demonstrated a DPS-QKD experiment with a channel loss of over 72 dB using a 336 km DSF and SSPDs with a DCR of 0.01 cps. The ultralow DCR of the SSPD was achieved by introducing a cold optical filter, which completely blocks the blackbody radiation at room temperature except for signal passband. 
